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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

RACIAL PROFILING REDUX

DAVID A. HARRIS*
In March of 2002, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch ran an article at the top of its
op-ed page entitled Wake Up: Arabs Should Be Profiled.1 The piece, written
by the African-American cultural critic and MacArthur Foundation “genius
grant” recipient Stanley Crouch, employed blunt language to make the case
that the government must target people on the basis of their ethnic appearance.
Crouch, in the past a foe of racial profiling of American blacks on the nation’s
highways, called unapologetically for treating all Arabs as suspects. “[I]f
pressure has to be kept on innocent Arabs until those Arabs who are intent on
committing mass murder are flushed out,” Crouch wrote, “that is the
unfortunate cost they must pay to reside in this nation.”2 Crouch has hardly
been alone among either pundits3 or the people who run the nation’s security
apparatus. Even as U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta says,
repeatedly and publicly, that there will be no racial or ethnic profiling in
airport security,4 those who run security operations have other ideas. Bruce
Baumgartner, manager of aviation at Denver International Airport, told Time
that what American airports need is more profiling, not less.5 A security
screener at Denver told the magazine that “[f]or me, profiling is the only way
to be conscientious in doing the job. I make decisions based on who I

* David A. Harris is the author of PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT
WORK (2002). He is the Balk Professor of Law and Values at the University of Toledo College
of Law.
1. Stanley Crouch, Wake Up: Arabs Should Be Profiled, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar.
19, 2002, at B7.
2. Id.
3. Kathleen Parker, All’s Fair In This War Except Insensitivity, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 26, 2002,
at 19; Charles Krauthammer, The Case for Profiling: Why Random Searches of Airline Travelers
Are a Useless Charade, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002, at 104; Jonah Goldberg, Profiles In Profiling,
NAT’L REV., Nov. 14, 2001.
4. Norman Y. Mineta, U.S. Secretary of Transportation, Remarks at the Arab Community
Center for Economic and Social Services Gala Dinner (Apr. 20, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/042002sp.htm) (“It is very tempting to take false comfort in the belief
that we can spot the bad guy based on appearance alone. Some are yielding to that temptation in
their arguments for racial profiling, but false comfort is a luxury we cannot afford.”).
5. Richard Zoglin & Sally B. Donnelly, Welcome to America’s Best Run Airport, And Why
It’s Still Not Good Enough, TIME, July 15, 2002, at 23.
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wouldn’t like to be seated next to on an airplane.” He went on to say that he
would, “without question,” investigate anyone “of Middle Eastern descent.”6
None of this is terribly difficult to understand. After all, every one of the
suicide hijackers of September 11, 2001, were young Arab Muslims from the
Middle East; Al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible, is based in the Middle
East and uses the Koran as justification for its unspeakable acts. Therefore, it
seems to many people that it “just makes sense” to focus on people from the
Middle East—Arabs and Muslims. It appears that the threat we face originates
with people of that background, so why do otherwise in the pursuit of safety?
This thinking has shown itself quite clearly in the change in polling results on
the issue of racial profiling. Before September 11, 2001, a surprising
consensus had emerged in our country concerning profiling. At that time,
almost sixty percent of the American public—not just African-Americans and
Latinos, but all citizens—knew what racial profiling was, and emphatically
wanted it stopped.7 But after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon over fifty percent of Americans, including members of minority
groups who had been most widely victimized by profiling in the past, said they
supported the use of profiling, as long as it was targeted at Middle Easterners
and Muslims in airports.8
Profiling may seem to be the obvious answer, but we have been down this
path before, with disastrous results. In the 1980s, it was the War on Drugs—a
metaphorical war, to be sure, not like the war against Al Qaeda—that led to
profiling.9 Unfortunately, instead of making us safer, using racial and ethnic
profiling will actually damage our antiterrorism efforts. What we should do
now is not plunge back into racial profiling, but instead think coolly and
clearly about what we learned about racial and ethnic profiling before
September 11. This will be a more difficult task than it sounds given the
climate of fear we now live in and with the Attorney General of the United
States declaring that those who raise questions about civil liberties at this
juncture do no less than aid the terrorists who want to kill us.10 Nevertheless,
6. Id. at 28.
7. Racial Profiling Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men, Gallup Poll
Organization, Dec. 9, 1999, reprinted in GEORGE GALLUP JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC
OPINION 1999, at 238 (1999).
8. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Felt Uneasy toward Arabs Even Before September 11, THE
GALLOP POLL MONTHLY, Sept. 2001, at 52; Jason L. Riley, Racial Profiling and Terrorism,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2001, at A22.
9. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
21-23, 48-52 (2002) [hereinafter PROFILES IN INJUSTICE].
10. Neil A. Lewis, Ashcroft Defends Antiterror Plan; Says Criticism May Aid U.S. Foes,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at A1 (quoting the Attorney General’s testimony before Congress, in
which he said that those who challenge the government’s policies “with phantoms of lost
liberty. . .only aid terrorists.”).
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we must take an unblinking look at the realities we now face. When we do, we
will see that there are genuine reasons to avoid using racial profiling now, lest
we actually make it easier for our enemies to strike us.
I. THE COURTS AND THE LAW: ENABLERS OF RACIAL PROFILING, AND
INEFFECTIVE TOOLS AGAINST IT
Most lawyers probably consider racial profiling one of those abhorrent
creatures that the law prohibits, like racial discrimination in employment or
housing, a practice that, if proven, will bring the legal equivalent of lightning
bolts hurled by Zeus down on the perpetrators. The real picture has always
been a good deal more complex, and remains so even in 2002, a full five years
since the first legal cases and major media stories about racial profiling began
to surface.11 It is no exaggeration to say that the courts have been largely
ineffective in the battle against profiling. In fact, the Supreme Court of the
United States must actually shoulder much of the blame for racial profiling.
Many members of the public still believe the United States Supreme Court
is a bastion of left-leaning liberalism, especially when it comes to the rights of
criminal defendants. This is obviously untrue now; and it has been untrue for
almost thirty years. In the early 1970s, with its membership clearly shifted
toward conservative majorities, the Supreme Court began limiting the rights of
criminal defendants, and, more importantly, increasing the discretion of police
officers to do searches and seizures in garden-variety street crime cases. For
example, in United States v. Robinson the Court increased the power of
officers making an arrest to do a full search of anyone arrested, regardless of
whether the arrestee presented any kind of a safety threat or could have hidden
or destroyed evidence.12 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte the Court affirmed the
power of police officers to search anyone—whether the police had probable
cause, reasonable suspicion, or any evidence at all of criminal involvement—
as long as officers obtained “voluntary” consent.13 The citizen need not give a
Miranda-type waiver, the Court said; and the police need not tell him he has an
absolute and unqualified right to refuse.14 As long as police did not coerce the
citizen into agreeing to the request, the suspect’s ignorance of his rights was
law enforcement’s bliss. After all, the Court said, it was important that police
be able to do warrantless searches without probable cause or any evidence at
all.15 This statement still seems remarkable today, given that anyone with even
the most rudimentary knowledge of Fourth Amendment requirements would

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
Id. at 247.
Id. at 243.
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surely consider fact-based suspicion of criminal wrongdoing the very heart of
constitutional protection against law enforcement intrusion, a sentiment dating
all the way back to the revolutionary era.16
Nowhere was this increase in police discretion with regard to searches and
seizures more noticeable than in the area of law enforcement power over
drivers and vehicles. In New York v. Belton, the Justices ruled that any time
anyone who has been riding in a vehicle was arrested—not just the driver or
owner, but any occupant—the entire interior of the vehicle could be searched,
including any closed compartments and containers, even if no one who had
been in the vehicle could reach any of these areas any longer.17 And in
California v. Acevedo, the Court solidified the power of officers to open closed
containers without a warrant even when no arrest took place.18
The Justices took on the use of criminal profiles (not racial profiles) in
United States v. Sokolow.19 In Sokolow, the defendants challenged the use of
the so-called “drug courier profile” utilized by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to spot possible drug couriers in airports. According to
the DEA, the profile was a group of otherwise innocent behavioral
characteristics—how a ticket was purchased, whether identification
information submitted matched up with other available information about the
traveler, and the like—that, exhibited together, predicted a greater chance that
the person under observation was a drug courier.20 The Supreme Court was
unimpressed with the defendants’ argument that probable cause or reasonable
suspicion could not be generated from a constellation of otherwise innocent
facts. On the contrary, the Court said, if the concurrent exhibition of certain
characteristics or behaviors was positively correlated with criminal behavior,
there is no reason that these behaviors should not be considered a legitimate
source for police suspicion of wrongdoing. The fact that the factors that made
up the profile were innocent in and of themselves made no difference at all.21
The Supreme Court’s efforts to grant police greater discretion over stops
and searches involving automobiles reached its high water mark in Whren v.
United States.22 Whren was a direct challenge to this accretion of police

16. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 197, 223 (1993) (arguing that some specific basis for suspicion must exist because
“historical evidence” suggests that the “broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness Clause is
that discretionary police power implicating Fourth Amendment interests cannot be trusted”).
17. 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
18. 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
19. 490 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1989).
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id. at 9. The Court reaffirmed this reasoning this past year in United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266 (2002).
22. 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996).
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powers; the defendants argued that the Justices should break with the eight
United States Courts of Appeals that had ruled that police could use
enforcement of traffic codes as a pretext, an excuse, to stop vehicles and
drivers for investigation of other offenses (chiefly, the possible presence of
drugs) for which there was absolutely no evidence.23 The Court ruled that
using traffic code enforcement as a pretext was acceptable, as long as some
traffic violation had actually occurred.24 The fact that the officer had no
interest at all in traffic enforcement, but instead was using it to make an endrun around the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that probable cause, or at
least reasonable suspicion, of criminal behavior exist in order to make a
forcible stop, did not trouble the Court in the least. The Fourth Amendment,
Justice Scalia wrote for a unanimous Court, could no longer come into play to
challenge pretext stops; the Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures was not offended, and could not be invoked, by those
claiming that police had stopped them for criminal violations without any
evidence except for traffic violations.25
It is noteworthy that the defendants in Whren argued to the Court that the
use of pretext stops would have a racially discriminatory impact. Citing thennew evidence of racial profiling from around the nation, the defendants argued
that statistics showed that allowing police broad discretion to use traffic stops
as an excuse to “fish” for other evidence might lead to racial profiling.26 The
Court brushed these concerns aside in a few terse sentences. If these pretext
stops were being used in racially discriminatory patterns, Justice Scalia said,
this had nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment; rather, it could only be
addressed in lawsuits for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.27
With these Supreme Court decisions as background, it is hardly surprising
that the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) began a sustained effort in
the 1980s and 1990s to train state and local police in the techniques of drug
courier profiling for use on the highway. This program, called Operation
Pipeline, was backed with millions of federal dollars.28 Taking full advantage
of the expanded discretion allowed to the police by the Court’s decisions, the
DEA trained literally tens of thousands of police officers from all over the
country, who then trained others in their own and other departments, and set up
state and local highway drug interdiction units.29 Combined with federal
government intelligence that was sent to local agencies that emphasized the
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 810.
Id. at 811-13, 819.
Id.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 813.
PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 48-52.
Id.
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race of drug traffickers in very general terms—“marijuana trafficking in New
Jersey is controlled by blacks,” for example—Operation Pipeline makes the
emergence of racial profiling entirely predictable.
Especially after Whren, the lack of litigation success in suits against racial
profiling does not seem surprising. Indeed, the only thing that seems
noteworthy is that so many lawyers and members of the public still believe that
these lawsuits have, in fact, had a major role in addressing and taming racial
profiling. To be sure, two of the first and most important cases of racial
profiling, occurring in Maryland and New Jersey, garnered attention through
successful litigation. The success and notoriety of these cases, however, is due
at least in part to their unusual circumstances. In Maryland, the case styled
Wilkins v. Maryland State Police,30 featured plaintiff Robert Wilkins, a softspoken, African-American, criminal defense attorney and Harvard Law School
graduate who repeatedly objected to his treatment by the State Police, even
citing cases to them. When litigation began, attorneys discovered a “smoking
gun” in State Police files, a written memorandum that clearly set out a racial
profile.31 The result in this case was a quick settlement in which the State
Police agreed to submit statistics on their stop and search practices to the
federal court for a period of several years, and to modify their policies and
practices.32 The case in New Jersey, styled State v. Pedro Soto,33 was based
not only on federal law but also on New Jersey’s Constitution and case law,
which provide citizens of that state with more protection against racial
discrimination than they have under federal law.34 Far more common are cases
in which courts slam the door on plaintiffs seeking to use the Equal Protection
Clause (as suggested by Justice Scalia in Whren) or anti-discrimination
statutes, usually by requiring that plaintiffs meet impossibly high standards to
prove these claims.35
In fact, only one type of litigation against profiling had consistent success
in the 1990s: so-called “pattern-and-practice” suits brought by the U.S.
Department of Justice under a specific federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 14141.36

30. See Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. 93-468 (D. Md.
approved Jan. 1, 1995).
31. Armed Drug Traffickers in Allegany County, Maryland: Police Officer Safety, CRIMINAL
INTELLIGENCE REPORT (Maryland State Police), Apr. 27, 1992 (on file with author).
32. Settlement Agrement, supra note 30, at 4-5.
33. 734 A.2d 350, 359-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
34. Id. at 360.
35. E.g., Washington v. Vogel, 106 F.3d 415 (11th Cir. 1997) (unpublished decision
affirming Washington v. Vogel, 880 F. Supp. 1542 (M.D.Fla. 1995)); Chavez v. Illinois State
Police, 251 F.3d 612, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2001); Daryl Kelly, Federal Racial Profiling Suit is
Dismissed, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2002, at B1.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2003]

RACIAL PROFILING REDUX

79

This statute allows the federal government to bring an action in federal court
when the facts show not just a single or even a few violations of law, but a
demonstrable pattern of civil rights deprivations by police over a sustained
period. A handful of such cases, in Pittsburgh, Los Angeles, Steubenville,
Ohio, and New Jersey, have resulted in consent decrees in which the police
departments have agreed to make changes in their policies, procedures,
training, internal structures, and administration.37 In several other cases,
including those in Washington, D.C. and Montgomery County, Maryland,
local governments have invited federal pattern and practice investigations and
agreed to be bound by federal recommendations.38 While these suits and
investigations unquestionably have made for better policing in the cities
affected, there have been relatively few of these cases since the statute’s
enactment in 1994.39 Perhaps more importantly, only the federal government
can bring these cases; the law makes no provision for any private right of
action.40
Thus, it has been institutions and methods other than courts and
litigation—legislatures, public discussion and debate, and interaction with
police departments themselves—that have become the major locus of activity
on the issue of racial profiling. Courts have not only provided little relief; they
have encouraged the activity and even enabled it to continue unaddressed.
II. WHAT WE KNEW ABOUT RACIAL PROFILING BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11
When public discussion of profiling first began in the middle 1990s, police
and public officials reacted uniformly; they denied that any such practice
existed, and said that any stories from people of color concerning the repeated
stops they experienced at the hands of the police were not evidence of any

37. Consent Decree, United States v. Pittsburgh (W.D. Penn. approved Apr. 16, 1997),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm; Consent Decree, United States
v. Los Angeles, No. 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. approved June 15, 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm; Consent Decree, United States v.
Steubenville Police Dept. (S.D. Ohio approved Sept. 3, 1997), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm; Joint Application for Entry of Consent
Decree, United States v. New Jersey, No. 99-5970 (D. N.J. approved Dec. 30, 1999), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm.
38. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THTE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN
POLICE DEPARTMENT (June 13, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/
dcmoa.htm; MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND, THE MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
POLICE AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY LODGE 35, INC. (Jan.
14, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/Pubs/mcagrmt.htm.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2000).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b) (2000).
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problem. Rather, these stories were simply the excuses of those caught
breaking the law. (Never mind the fact that the stories came largely from lawabiding, tax-paying citizens who had never been charged with any crime.) But
with the release of data from Maryland, New Jersey, and other jurisdictions in
the mid to late 1990s, the denial argument became untenable. All of these
data, from different places in the country and from different law enforcement
agencies with different missions, pointed in the same direction: police officers
in these departments were definitely using race and ethnic appearance to target
minorities for searches and seizures at levels widely disproportionate to the
presence of these same people among the driving population.41 These
disparities were so statistically striking that the leading expert in the field, Dr.
John Lamberth of Temple University, described them this way: “While no one
can know the motivation of each individual trooper in conducting a traffic stop,
the statistics . . ., representing a broad and detailed sample of highly
appropriate data, show without question a racially discriminatory impact on
blacks. . . . The disparities are sufficiently great that, taken as a whole, they
are consistent and strongly support the assertion that [police] targeted the
community of black motorists for stop, detention, and investigation. . . .”42
Thus, it began to become obvious to most observers that the countless stories
of African-Americans and Latinos were not just stories, but rather illustrations
of a real, measurable phenomenon.
This new information caused a shift in the public debate. To be sure, some
still contend that there is no such thing as racial profiling.43 But, by and large,
the discussion has changed. Defenders of profiling now contend that the
practice is simply a common sense, rational response to high levels of
criminality among minorities. Look at arrest rates and imprisonment rates,
they say; minorities are vastly over-represented in relation to their presence in
the population. Therefore, the argument goes, it just makes sense to target

41. For a review of racial profiling data, the circumstances of the cases surrounding their
release, and the stories of individuals subjected to race-based traffic stops, see PROFILES IN
INJUSTICE, supra note 9; David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING WHILE
BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR NATION’S HIGHWAYS (June
1999),
http://archive.aclu.org/profiling/report/index.html.
42. John Lamberth, Report of John Lamberth, Ph.D. (Nov. 8, 1996) (an expert report
prepared in connection to Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, No. 93-483 (D. Md. 1993)), available
at http://archive.aclu.org/court/lamberth.html.
43. Most vocal among these critics is Heather Mac Donald of the Manhattan Institute of
New York. See Heather Mac Donald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 2001,
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/11_2_the_myth.html; Heather Mac Donald, The
Myth of Racial Profiling Debunked, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 2002, available at http://www.cityjournal.org/html/ eon_3_27_02hm.html.
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these populations with our law enforcement resources.44 By encouraging
police to pull over, stop, frisk, and search more people of color, racial profiling
gives police a leg up in the fight against crime and drugs. By focusing on
blacks and Latinos, police increase the odds that those they stop and search
will be criminals. It is simple, and will help officers catch more bad guys, find
more drugs, and confiscate more guns than would otherwise be the case. In
other words, racial profiling is just smart crime fighting. As one police
spokesman explained, the fact that racial profiling results in larger numbers of
arrests of blacks and Latinos is just an unfortunate by-product of sound
policing.45
There are at least two problems with this thinking. First, when proponents
of profiling point to disproportionate incarceration and arrest levels among
minority populations, they are not wrong about those facts. Blacks, Latinos,
and others are, in fact, disproportionately arrested and incarcerated.46 Those
may be difficult facts for some to admit, but that does not make them less true.
The real question is what those facts actually mean.
Supporters of racial profiling use these numbers as a kind of substitute
crime rate, arguing that the elevated arrest and incarceration rates are
indicative of a higher rate of criminal perpetration among blacks and other
minorities, and that is where they err. Arrest rates are not, as many seem to
believe, measurements of crime. Arrest rates are measurements of a particular
type of law enforcement behavior—arresting. The same goes for statistics on
incarceration. These numbers do not measure crime; rather, they measure what
one might call incarceration behavior by relevant actors: judges who
pronounce sentences, legislators who pass laws governing sentences, members
of sentencing commissions, and the like. Arrest rates and imprisonment rates
may have some relationship to actual rates of offending, but how close a
relationship, whether it varies by type of crime, and how great a variation we
might see, are all questions that, at best, remain unanswered by simply citing
arrest and imprisonment statistics. This very point was made four decades ago
by two social scientists, John Kitsuse and Aaron Cicourel.47 Kitsuse and
Cicourel showed that while records of arrest and court activity give us useful
information regarding the activity of institutions like police departments and
courts, they present real problems when used to depict patterns of criminal
44. See, e.g., Marshall Frank, Racial Profiling: Better Safe Than Sorry, MIAMI HERALD,
Oct. 19, 1999, at B7 (arguing that disproportionately high rates of imprisonment among blacks
justify more intense scrutiny of blacks by law enforcement).
45. Michael Fletcher, Driven to Extremes; Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops,
WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at A1.
46. PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 75-76.
47. John Kitsuse & Aaron Cicourel, A Note on the Use of Official Statistics, 11 SOCIAL
PROBLEMS 131 (1963).
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behavior or characteristics of offenders.48 In his 1995 Southerland Prize
lecture to the American Society of Criminology, the esteemed criminologist
Delbert Elliot of the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence at the
University of Colorado asserted that we had failed to heed Kitsuse and
Cicourel, and “had fallen into bad habits” by continuing to use arrest data to
support conclusions about the characteristic behaviors of offenders. Using
statistics this way, Elliot said, will “lead to incorrect conclusions, ineffective
policies and practices, and ultimately undermine our efforts to understand,
prevent, and control criminal behavior.”49 There is nothing wrong with using
arrest and imprisonment numbers, but they can only help us if we understand
them for what they are.
The second problem with the racial-profiling-is-common-sense-crimefighting idea—stop and search more minorities and you will catch more
criminals—is that it is an assumption. It is a strongly held, confidently
expressed assumption to be sure, but an assumption nonetheless, and it has
never been tested until recently. But now, new data about police stops and
searches, available in just the last couple of years, enables us to test this central
assumption. These new data, gathered from different enforcement agencies in
various parts of the country, allow us to make direct comparisons between the
success rates of stops and searches when police use racial profiling on
minorities, to their success rates when they use nonracial policing techniques
on whites. In other words, these new data allow us to compare the rate at
which officers “hit”—find drugs, guns, or other contraband—using
nonracialized policing based on observation of suspicious behavior (i.e., the
stops and searches of whites) with the hit rate for racially targeted policing (the
highly disproportionate stops and searches of blacks and Latinos). These hit
rates can help us answer the question that has previously gone unasked: does
profiling using race and ethnic appearance, in fact, help catch more bad guys?
The hit rate data come from at least half a dozen studies.50 They cover a
range of geographic areas, law enforcement missions, and agency sizes. All
data were collected by the law enforcement agencies themselves. It is surely
fair to say that the result in all of these studies would come as something of a
surprise to supporters of racial profiling as a common-sense tool in crime
fighting. All the data showed that concentrating on minorities did not, in fact,
yield more arrests than using traditional tactics of behavioral observation
against whites. Race-based stops and searches of minorities actually yielded

48. Id.
49. Delbert Elliot, Lies, Damn Lies, and Arrest Statistics, address at the Southerland Award
Presentation to the American Society of Criminology (Nov.1995).
50. The details of hit rate studies quoted here appear in more detail in PROFILES IN
INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 79-81.
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fewer hits on a percentage basis in all of these studies than traditional,
behavior-based stops of whites did. The upshot of this remarkable consistency
across a number of different studies is hard to miss: law enforcement using
racial and ethnic profiles is not, in fact, a sensible crime fighting tool. It
actually works less well than traditional policing, which relies on observation
of behavior. Racial and ethnic profiling do not increase law enforcement’s
efficiency or its yield; in fact, using this tactic drags policing down—the
equivalent of having police officers chase crooks with lead weights around
their ankles.
Though these results, solid as they are, seem counterintuitive, they are not
difficult to understand on reflection. Using race or ethnic appearance to decide
who is suspicious turns officers away from what we might call the first
principle of good policing: the observation of suspicious behavior. Using
racial profiling, officers pay attention instead to racial or ethnic appearance—a
characteristic that may describe someone well, but that has little power to
predict criminal behavior in any sizeable population. By contrast, proactive
police work is all about looking at what people do. Behavior is the best clue an
officer can have about what someone is up to and what the person may do
next.
All of this discussion about the effectiveness of racial profiling, of course,
simply adds to the very real and important moral and social concern the issue
generates. Americans have long recognized the moral bankruptcy of the idea
of group guilt. Just because someone belongs to a group that has some small
number of members who may do harm, we cannot treat all members of that
group as presumptively guilty of the offense. When we have deviated from
that principle—the internment of the Japanese during World War II springs
readily to mind51—we have, at least belatedly, acknowledged these actions as
terrible mistakes.52 Group guilt, or, perhaps better said, group suspicion, is
exactly what racial and ethnic profiling is. As far as social costs, we have long
since passed the point at which the damage done by racial and ethnic
profiling—the anger, distrust and cynicism that it causes—could be said to
damage only individual citizens, or even just particular ethnic or racial groups.
These costs have leached out of the targeted groups and into society as a
whole, causing widespread suspicion, not just of policing; but also of courts,

51. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (refusing to strike down
internment orders).
52. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F.Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating
convictions because government information supporting internment-related orders was false);
Restitution for World War II Internment of Japanese-Americans and Aleuts, 50 U.S.C. § 1989
(1988); see generally Frank Wu, Profiling In the Wake of September 11: The Precedent of
Japanese Internment, 17 CRIM. JUSTICE 52, 56 (Summer 2002).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

84

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:73

the entire legal system, and even the rule of law itself.53 When one segment of
society is seen as unfairly targeted or persecuted by the system, the system
itself loses legitimacy—not just in the eyes of those on the receiving end of the
abusive treatment, but also in the eyes of all citizens. And that is a cost to all
of society.
For these and other reasons, most importantly the existence of broad public
support and political pressure for action, states and cities around the country
have begun to take the first steps to address profiling. This movement (if that
is not too bold a word) began with the 105th Congress, when Representative
John Conyers, Jr. of Michigan seized on a proposal made in a law review
article: police should collect basic data on each and every police stop.54
Conyers introduced a piece of legislation embodying all of the proposal’s
central elements: data would be collected on each traffic stop, including the
reason for the stop, the race of the driver, whether a search was conducted and
on what basis, and whether the search uncovered any contraband. The
proposed legislation, called the Traffic Stops Statistics Act,55 attracted virtually
no notice at first, and, therefore, no opposition. But, when an amended version
of the bill emerged with a unanimous recommendation from the Republicancontrolled U.S. House Judiciary Committee and then passed the House of
Representatives without any opposition in March of 1998,56 the public
suddenly became aware of it. The passage of the bill was widely reported in
the press, and police groups quickly mobilized in opposition to it. A fairly
typical reaction came from the National Association of Police Organizations
(NAPO), an umbrella group that represents approximately four thousand police
interest groups. There was “no pressing need or justification” for any action
on the problem, a NAPO spokesman said, since there was no real problem.57
Furthermore, officers would “resent” having to take any steps to address this
nonexistent problem, even just the step of collecting data.58 This opposition,
combined with the presidential impeachment proceedings that seized the
attention of Congress and the nation in the fall of 1998, was enough to kill the
bill’s chances of passage by the Senate during what remained of the 105th
Congress. A new version of the bill was introduced unsuccessfully in the 106th

53. PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 117-21.
54. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 579-80 (1997).
55. Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997).
56. 144 CONG. REC. H1387 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998), available at 1998 WL 129711.
57. Robert L. Jackson, Fight Against Discriminatory Traffic Stops Appears to Have Hit a
Police Roadblock, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 1998, at A5.
58. Id.
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Congress;59 and a much more comprehensive piece of legislation—The End
Racial Profiling Act of 200160—was still pending at the end of 2002.
Even if the federal legislation never passes, however, there is now real
government action in many places that is designed to address the issue in some
basic ways. More than fifteen states have passed legislation mandating some
kind of data collection on traffic stops, as well as requiring other actions and
changes including written policies against profiling and new training
programs.61 Missouri’s legislation62 represents the best of these efforts. It
59. Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of 1999, H.R. 1443, 106th Cong. (1999).
60. S. 989, 107th Cong. (2001).
61. E.g., COLORADO (COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-309 (2001) (defines “profiling” and bans
peace officers from doing it); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-115 (2001) (data collection on traffic
stops to include race among other characteristics); CONNECTICUT (CONN. GEN. STAT. §54-11
(2001) (prohibition against racial profiling by police departments; data collection required);
KANSAS (KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4604 (2002)); MARYLAND (MD. CODE. ANN., TRANSP. §
25-113 (2001) (race data must be collected by officers at traffic stops, but profiling shall not be
used by officers making traffic stops); MISSOURI (MO. REV. STAT. § 590.050 (2001) (annual
education for police officers opposing use of racial profiling and encouraging respect for all
races); MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650 (2001) (prohibits the practice of routinely stopping members
of minority groups for violations of vehicle laws as a pretext for investigating other violations of
criminal law); NEBRASKA (NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-501 (2002) (defines “racial profiling” and
refers to motorists being stopped based solely upon their race as a discriminatory practice); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 20-502 (2002) (prohibits the use of racial profiling by all police officers in the
state); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-503 (2002) (racial profiling defined as “detaining an individual or
conducting a motor vehicle stop based upon disparate treatment of an individual); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 20-504 (2002) (police must collect data on race from their traffic stops); NORTH
CAROLINA (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10 (2002) (data collection on race by police officers
making stop); RHODE ISLAND (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-2 (2001) (prohibits use of racial
profiling in traffic stops); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-4 (2001) (traffic stop studies to be conducted
by R.I. Att’y Gen.); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-21.1-5 (2001) (prohibits the use of racial profiling as
the sole reason for stopping or searching motorists for routine traffic stops); TENNESSEE
(TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-402 (2001) (police must record info on traffic stops including race);
TEXAS (TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 96.641 (Vernon 2002) (chiefs of police are to have initial and
continuing training on racial profiling); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.253 (Vernon 2002) (as part
of the minimum curriculum requirements, the commission shall establish a statewide
comprehensive education and training program on racial profiling for officers licensed under this
chapter); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 1701.402 (Vernon 2002) (racial profiling certificates for law
enforcement officers that participate in the program); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.131
(Vernon 2002) (a peace officer may not engage in racial profiling); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 2.135 (Vernon 2002); (Certain law enforcement agencies shall retain the video and
audio documentation of each traffic and pedestrian stop for at least 90 days after the date of the
stop. If a complaint is filed with the law enforcement agency alleging that a peace officer
employed by the agency has engaged in racial profiling with respect to a traffic or pedestrian stop,
the agency shall retain the video and audio record of the stop until final disposition of the
complaint); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.132 (Vernon 2002) (prohibits use of racial
profiling and requires data collection from traffic stops including race); UTAH (UTAH CODE
ANN. § 53-1-106 (2002) (public safety code department administration must maintain a database
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mandates an end to racial profiling, the collection of data on all traffic stops by
every law enforcement agency in the state, new written policies against racial
profiling, and anti-profiling training for officers.63 For departments that do not
comply with these requirements, the law empowers the state’s attorney general
to recommend to the governor that these departments lose their state funding.64
Missouri Attorney General Jay Nixon, whose office has supervised
implementation of the new law, says the statute represents a comprehensive
and strong effort to deal with the problem.65
Perhaps more significant than these legislative efforts, hundreds of police
agencies around the country that are not under any legislative obligation to do

of information including the race of the person stopped and checked and the race of the law
enforcement officer who made the stop); see also Components of Racial Profiling Legislation,
Memorandum from the Institute on Race & Poverty, to Senators Linda Berglin, Jane Ranum, and
Representative Greg Gray (March 5, 2001), http://www.instituteonraceandpoverty.org/
publications/racialprofiling.html.
There are additional states that have passed legislation, the provisions of which do not
require data collection. These laws usually just prohibit racial profiling but carry no
consequences: e.g., CALIFORNIA (CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519.4 (Dearing 2002) (Police officers
are to be trained not to use racial profiling as a tool. Data collection regarding race is voluntary.);
KENTUCKY (KY. REV. STATE. ANN. § 15A.195 (Michie 2001)); LOUISIANA (LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32:398.10 (West 2002) (officers must view learning video about racial profiling,
inapplicable to any law enforcement agency or department that has adopted a written policy
against racial profiling); MINNESOTA (MINN. STAT. § 626.8471 (2001) (racial profiling defined
and officers trained); MINN. STAT. § 626.951 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 626.9513 (2001) (study to
be carried out by the state commissioner of safety and those law enforcement agencies whom
volunteer to be part of the study); MINN. STAT. § 626.9514 (2001) (Att’y Gen. must have a toll
free phone number for complaints about incidents of racial profiling); MINN. STAT. § 626.9517
(2001) (grants to agencies participating in racial profiling study for the purchase of video cameras
for police vehicles); OKLAHOMA (OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 34.3 (2002) (racial profiling is
prohibited and criminalized; racial profiling it is a misdemeanor); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 34.4
(2002) (victim of racial profiling may file a complaint with the Oklahoma Human Rights
Commission and may also file a complaint with the district attorney for the county in which the
stop or arrest occurred); OKLA. STAT. tit 22, § 34.5 (2002)); WASHINGTON (WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.43.490 (West 2002) (training police officers on racial profiling); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 43.43.480(1) (West 2002) (data collection, including race, is encouraged for all traffic
stops); WEST VIRGINIA (W. VA. CODE § 30-29-10 (2001) (racial profiling by law enforcement
agencies is prohibited).
62. See MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650, et seq. (2000 & Supp. 2001).
63. MO. REV. STAT. § 590.650.6 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
64. Id.
65. Jeremiah W. (“Jay”) Nixon, Remarks on Racial Profiling in Missouri, 22 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 53, 53 (2003). For a discussion of the origin of the Missouri statute see Leland
Ware, Prohibiting Racial Profiling: The ACLU’s Orchestration of the Missouri Legislaiton, 22
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 59, 60 (2003).
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so have taken similar action on their own.66 In fact, this has become common
enough that an announcement that a city will begin collecting data no longer
makes national headlines the way that it did just a short time ago. It is easy to
forget that the first sizeable agencies to begin collecting data on their own –
San Diego and San Jose, California – began their efforts only in 1999.67 While
data collection is hardly the norm everywhere, it no longer stands out as
something that all police agencies resist.
III. PROFILING IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
In the aftermath of the catastrophic terrorist attacks on September 11, we
learned that all of those who had hijacked the planes that day were Arabs and
Muslims from Middle Eastern countries.68 Our enemy was Al Qaeda, an

66. E.g., in CALIFORNIA: San Diego (Jean Allience Colston, Ignorance Will Not Bring
Equality, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUTE, April 28, 2002, at G3), San Jose (Lisa O’Neill Hill,
Delving Into Disparities: Issue Under Study, Scrutiny Locally and Nationwide, PRESSENTERPRISE, February 24, 2002, at A1), Los Angeles (Solomon Moore, The State Rights Groups
Sue Davis Over Racial Profiling Data, LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 2, 2001, at B8); in
FLORIDA: Jacksonville and Florida Highway Patrol (Manoucheka Celeste, Profiling No Longer
Practiced, Police Say Officials Support Law Banning Racial Stops, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, June
22, 2001, at B1); in MICHIGAN: Grand Rapids (Mike Connell, Search After Traffic Stop Raises
Question of Equal Treatment, TIMES HERALD (Port Huron, Mich.) May 19, 2002, at 7B),
Highway Patrol (Survey Doesn’t Reveal Profiling, CHICAGO TRIB., January 25, 2001, at 3); in
OHIO: Cincinnati (Derrick DePledge, Promise to End Racial Profiling on Back Burner After
Sept. 11, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, April 19, 2002, available at 2002 WL 5257537), Ohio State
Highway Patrol (Jennine Zeleznik, State Sen. Roberts’ Bill Would Require Demographic Data
From Traffic Stops; Legislation Would Show if Agencies Using Racial Profiling, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, April 18, 2002, at 3B), Cleveland (T.C. Brown, O’Connor Says Racial Profiling Not A
Problem, PLAIN DEALER, December 8, 2000 at 8B); in OREGON: Highway Patrol and Portland
Police (Maxine Bernstein, State Police Post Findings On Stops By Driver’s Race, OREGONIAN,
May 9, 2002, at A1); in PENNSYLVANIA: Highway Patrol (Keith Herbert, Forms Arrive Late
for Penn State Study of Racial Patterns in Police Traffic Stops; State Troopers Will Take
Information to Look for Evidence of Profiling, MORNING CALL (Allentown), April 2, 2002, at
B4), Pittsburgh and Philadelphia Police (John M.R. Bull, State Panel Hears Testimony on Racial
Profiling by Police, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, October 23, 2001 at pg B7); in SOUTH
CAROLINA: State Highway Patrol (Greg Rickabaugh, Study Hints Police Ticket More Blacks;
Survey Suggests South Carolina Troopers are Pulling Over, Citing High Percentage of
Minorities, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, July 1, 2001, at C1); in WISCONSIN: Madison (Pat
Schneider, Latinos Tell of Fear in Sauk; Want Traffic Cops to Keep Racial Data, Stop
Harassment, CAPITAL TIMES, July 11, 2002, at 1B).
67. See Paul Van Slambrouck, Two cities tackle racial profiling, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 29, 1999, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1999/03/29/fp2s1csm.shtml.
68. Dan Eggen & Cheryl W. Thompson, U.S. Seeks Thousands of Fugitive Deportees;
Middle Eastern Men are Focus of Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A1, available at 2002
WL 2519501.
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organization based on a radical (some even say perverted) interpretation of the
Islamic faith.69 In a heartbeat, everything we had learned about racial
profiling—its costs and the illusory nature of its crime-fighting benefits—
disappeared. Since the perpetrators were all young Muslim men from the
Middle East, the solution seemed obvious: we needed to use a profile at
airports that would focus law enforcement attention on young Middle Eastern
men. An ethnic profile targeting them was not discrimination; it was a sensible
anti-terrorist measure. Syndicated columnist Kathleen Parker gave voice to
this feeling when she called racial profiling of Middle Eastern men “a
temporary necessity that no patriotic American should protest.”70
A.

Is It Happening?

The first question that should be asked is whether or not ethnic profiling of
Arabs and Muslims is in fact happening. There seems to be a widespread
belief that the government is bending over backwards to avoid ethnic profiling.
While certain segments of the government may in fact be doing so, it is also
obvious that ethnic targeting is definitely in use. For example, in an eerie echo
of the DEA’s Operation Pipeline, the 1980s effort to spread racial profiling to
traffic enforcement all across the nation,71 federal law enforcement officials
now travel the nation offering anti-terrorism training to state and local police.
The federal officials tell local officers to use traffic stops as a pretext to spot
potential terrorists.72 “Among the items police are taught to look for besides
phony passports and fake or stolen drivers’ licenses: prayer rugs and copies of
the Koran, Islam’s holy book.”73
Even more disturbing, however, are some of the actions of the U.S.
Department of Justice. In the fall of 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft
decreed that the Department would conduct “voluntary” interviews with 5,000
young men from the Middle East.74 In the spring of 2002, the Attorney
General added another 3,000 names to the list.75 The Department has also
detained hundreds of Middle Easterners on petty immigration violations and

69. Aaron Zitner & Richard A. Serrano, Response to Terror the Anthrax Threat Answers in
Anthrax Probe Only Yield More, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2001, at A5, available at 2001 WL
28922057.
70. Parker, supra note 3, at 19.
71. PROFILES IN INJUSTICE, supra note 9, at 21-23.
72. Kevin Johnson, In the Heartland, A Call to Mobilize, USA TODAY, Mar. 25, 2002, at 1A.
73. Id.
74. Allan Lengel, Arab Men in Detroit to Be Asked to See U.S. Attorney, WASH. POST, Nov.
27, 2001, at A5, available at 2001 WL 30328341.
75. Special Report with Brit Hume, Fox News television broadcast (Mar. 20, 2002),
available at 2002 WL 5584774.
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minor criminal violations.76 The exact number still detained as of this writing
is not known because the Department has refused to answer any questions
about the detainees.77 The Attorney General has also used the material witness
statute78 to detain those he suspects of involvement, but against whom he has
no evidence.79 All of this is racial and ethnic targeting by any other name.
Concededly, the violators of immigration law detained by the Department of
Justice have broken the law. Yet, while hundreds of thousands of other people
in this country have also broken immigration laws, the government has only
detained members of one narrow group for these offenses, Muslims and
Middle Easterners, who have been selected for this treatment by virtue of
ethnicity.
B.

Will It Work?

If officials are, in fact, using ethnic profiling now, a second question looms
even larger: will it work? Will ethnic profiling actually help to make the U.S.
safe from terrorists? Many people today seem to regard the use of ethnic
profiles against Middle Easterners as “just common sense” in the fight against
terrorism. But, as in the War on Drugs, this “common sense” profiling of
Middle Easterners has little to do with good, solid law enforcement. And in
the end, it will almost certainly blunt efforts to protect the country against
terrorists, particularly Al Qaeda.
First, consider the centerpiece of all good police work: observation of
suspicious behavior. It is a truism among veteran police officers that it is not
what people look like that tells them who to regard as suspicious; it is what
people do that matters.80 If police officers want to know what someone is up
to, they watch the subject’s behavior; what the person has done and what the
person is doing now are the best indicators of what that person will do in the
future. Using a racial or ethnic profile to decide whom to stop and search cuts
directly against this experience-based rule. When law enforcement uses skin
color or ethnic appearance as a proxy for actual dangerousness, law
enforcement agents shift their attention. They begin to turn away from what
counts—how people behave—and instead attend to what people look like.

76. Dan Eggen, Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged; Ashcroft Tells Mayors He Will Use
New Law to Fullest Extent, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 29164803.
77. Siobhan Gorman, Power to the Government, NAT’L J., Jul 27, 2002, available at 2002
WL 7095407.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
79. Steve Fainaru & Dan Eggen, Judge Rules U.S. Must Release Detainees’ Names, WASH.
POST, Aug. 3, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 24825355.
80. Indeed, this was a sentiment expressed to the author by experienced officers so
frequently in the course of research interviews that few ever question it. All behavioral profiling
depends on this assumption.
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They pay less attention to what is important—behavior—and more to what is
literally only skin deep. It is crucial that those on the front line in the fight
against Al Qaeda not miss anything that might tell them whether any particular
person they observe is a potential terrorist; injecting race or ethnic appearance
into the mix of characteristics that we want police to look for when they search
for possible terrorists can only distract officers from what actually counts.
The distraction of law enforcement agents from all-important behavioral
clues leads directly to a second point. Even a “good” profile, one that is based
on rigorously analyzed statistics culled from plentiful, systematically collected
data, will cast suspicion over more innocent people than guilty ones. When we
construct a profile using the wrong kind of characteristic—racial ones as
opposed to markers of behavior—we effectively enlarge our suspect pool.
When the police regard as suspects not just those who act like potential
terrorists but also those who look like potential terrorists, they end up with
many more people to investigate, the overwhelming majority of whom will
have exhibited no behavior in which the police might be interested. This will
inevitably mean that law enforcement resources and efforts will be spread
more thinly than is wise. Even the FBI does not have unlimited manpower;
every person who they must investigate because he “looks like a terrorist”
takes away enforcement resources from investigations of suspects who actually
behave suspiciously. And that is a trade off that makes little sense.
Third, if the keenest possible observation of behavior is one of the pillars
of solid police work, then the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
intelligence is surely another. Intelligence in police work is simply
information, information that tells law enforcement about things in a
community that are suspicious. There is nothing new in this as far as police
work goes. Ask any veteran police detective what it takes to solve a major
crime, a murder, say, or a robbery. Since police almost never observe such
crimes when they occur, they have to figure out who did it after the fact. From
watching television and movies, one might think that Sherlock Holmes-style
deduction or high-tech forensic work in the crime lab do the trick. While this
is certainly true in some cases, what counts much more often is what people
who live and work in the area will tell police.81 It is a truism among police
officers that in most murders perpetrated by persons unknown to the police,
81. The best example of this as of this writing is the arrest and indictment of six men of
Yemeni descent in Lackawanna, N.Y., in the fall of 2002, for various terrorism-related crimes.
The information leading to the apprehension of the men came not from spy satellites or
infiltrators but from members of the Yemeni community in Lackawanna. Philip Shenon, Threats
and Responses: Indictment; U.S. Says Suspects Awaited An Order For Terror Strike, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2002, at A1 (investigation was begun after federal law enforcement received
“information from within the area’s Muslim community months ago [prior to indictment] that
people loyal to Al Qaeda might be living among them”).
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people in the neighborhood usually know who did the crime; it is only the
police who do not. Solving these crimes depends on getting the public to give
that information to the police.
We have all heard numerous times since September 11, 2001, how the
events of that day represent a massive failure of the intelligence agencies to
compile the necessary information due to an egregious failure to “connect the
dots.”82 These failures, and the real possibility that we may very well have Al
Qaeda “sleeper” cells of Middle Easterners on our soil, obviously make
intelligence gathering more crucial than it has ever been. Intelligence agencies
and law enforcement simply must have open lines of free-flowing
communication with those who might have important information on potential
terrorists. That information will almost certainly have to come from those
most likely to encounter the individuals in these “sleeper” cells: members of
Middle Eastern, Muslim, and Arab communities. Thus, what law enforcement
needs most right now are solid relationships with the Arab and Muslim
communities in the U.S., relationships based on trust and mutual interest,
fostered over time while working as partners in fighting crime. However,
using a profile focusing on Arab and Muslim heritage—whether by
questioning 8,000 young male Arabs, or by detaining an unknown number of
Middle Easterners (but no members of any other group) on petty immigration
charges—will not foster trust; it will not help build the solid relationships
necessary for effective communication and real partnership. Rather, profiling
will do quite the opposite: it will communicate to these communities that law
enforcement regards them not as partners in terror prevention, but as potential
terrorists—in short, as suspects. When we take away their freedom on
relatively trivial grounds on the chance that they might be terrorists, since we’d
rather be safe than sorry, we sow not trust, but fear. This fear naturally cuts off
the possibilities for open communication, destroying our ability to gather
crucial intelligence.
All of this explains why many high-placed law enforcement professionals
quickly rejected the “common sense” approach of profiling Middle Easterners.
Attorney General Ashcroft’s “voluntary” questioning of Middle Eastern men
met with instant skepticism in many major police departments. Police
command staff quickly recognized the damage that this questioning would do
to their long-term efforts to build crime-fighting partnerships and intelligence
links with their Middle Eastern communities.83 Eight former FBI officials,
including former FBI and CIA chief William H. Webster, went on record in the

82. Al Kamen, Stand by Your Man, Sort of, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2001, at A29, available at
2001 WL 28361577.
83. E.g., Fox Butterfield, Police Are Split On Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2001, at A1.
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Washington Post to voice doubts about the law enforcement value of these
tactics.84 “It’s the Perry Mason School of Law Enforcement . . .,” according to
Kenneth Walton, a former assistant FBI director.85 The interviews, he said,
would likely produce nothing more valuable than “the recipe to Mom’s
chicken soup.”86 Little wonder, then, that senior intelligence officials
circulated a memorandum just weeks after the events of September 11 that
warned law enforcement and intelligence agents about the dangers of racial
and ethnic profiling.87 Profiling with racial or ethnic characteristics should be
avoided at all costs, the intelligence professionals said, but not because it was
politically incorrect, would generate bad publicity, or might lead to lawsuits.
The reasons were much more straightforward: profiling with these skin-deep
characteristics would fail. The only way to succeed was careful observation of
suspicious behavior and intelligence gathering. “[F]undamentally, believing
that you can achieve safety by looking at characteristics instead of behavior is
silly,” one of the officials told the Boston Globe.88 “If your goal is preventing
attacks. . .you want your eyes and ears looking for pre-attack behaviors, not
characteristics.”89
The fourth point may be the most important of all as we consider using
racial profiling against Al Qaeda. The profiling of Middle Easterners shows a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of what we are up against in Al
Qaeda. The Al Qaeda organization is a viciously murderous terrorist
organization based in the Middle East that is bent on killing Americans and
Westerners.90 No one disagrees with these facts. But Al Qaeda is something
else as well: an organization that has consistently shown itself to be highly
intelligent, patient, and thoroughly adaptable. Woe be unto us if we forget this.
The attack on the World Trade Towers on September 11 was not the first
assault on this landmark, but the second. When the first attack, in 1993,91
failed to accomplish their goal, these terrorists took eight years to install a new
set of agents on American soil, devise an entirely new method of attack, plan it
down to the smallest detail, and then practice it so that it could be carried out

84. Jim McGee, Ex-FBI Officials Criticize Tactics on Terrorism, WASH. POST, Nov. 28,
2001, at A1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Bill Dedman, Memo Warns Against Use of Profiling As Defense, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
12, 2001, at A27.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Richard A. Serrano, Judge Says No Need to Prove Lindh Killed, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2,
2002, at A10, available at 2002 WL 2465531.
91. Dan Eggen, FBI Launches Massive Manhunt: Hijackers Trained as Pilots in U.S.,
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WL 27732028.
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almost perfectly.92 These people are not stupid; just because they are killers
does not mean that we can count on them to act like fools. Since Al Qaeda
knows we are now looking for young, Middle Eastern suicide hijackers, they
will almost certainly try something different—for example, attacking us with
non-Arabs from countries outside the Middle East, like British citizen Richard
Reid93 or American Jose Padilla,94 or attempting to get explosives on airliners
in luggage of unsuspecting passengers or the tons of unscreened cargo that are
shipped on commercial jets everyday.95
Those who insist on the “common sense” of focusing on Middle Eastern
men ignore all of this. They suggest that the U.S. can be safe if we focus on
and inconvenience only suspicious “others,” not ourselves. These people face
backwards, toward the past—when the only way to safety is to look forward,
toward what our enemy may do next.

92. Walter Pinkus, Mueller Outlines Origin, Funding of Sept. 11 Plot, WASH. POST, June 6,
2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 21749706.
93. David Johnston, A Nation Challenged: The Bombing Suspect; Al Qaeda Trained
Bombing Suspect, Indictment Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A1, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/search/articlepage.html?res=9c04E6D71138F934A25752C0A9649C8B63.
94. Associated Press, Padilla Lawyers to Give Arguments on Secret Report: Government
Challenges Disclosure, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at A15, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A13903-2002Oct24.html.
95. See Blake Morrison, Failures In Cargo Security Reported, USA TODAY, May 22, 2002,
at 1A.
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